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Abstract: History books are full of success stories.  Intellectuals are interested in such stories because 
they are important in human history – they are important especially for those who are willing to know 
more about how we have reached the peak points of human civilization.  History books, however, do not 
always credit issues of human failure and error.  The social element – that is, the set of undesirable 
consequences of the imperfect character of human doings – are thus left out as irrelevant.  Oddities and 
wrongheadedness, for instance, are not at the forefronts of human notice.  They are seen only as 
peculiarities to be corrected sooner or later.  Human failure and error are important as they are often left 
uncorrected in time.  That is to say, we keep repeating the same errors through time.  Uncorrected errors 
of the past sometimes generate undesirability, dissatisfaction, and disappointment in the future, because 
such errors prevent us from producing pragmatic solutions to practical problems in the economy and 
society.  They prevent us from reaching “the general equilibrium.”  They prevent us from getting at “the 
fundamental truth.”  The world is, therefore, not the best of all possible worlds.  The world, unlike the 
portrayals of neo-classical economics in general and Paul Samuelson in particular, is a world of 
transaction costs, as Ronald Coase argued, in the form of human failure and error.  Consequences of such 
errors, which do not disappear easily and without causing further trouble, make the idea impossible – the 
idea that perfection in the world of humans is achievable.  I illustrate in the paper that there are such 
errors in human history that cause path dependence in the economy and society.  Many errors in the past, 
I argue, are not corrected – they linger.  History is therefore not only a bunch of success stories in the 
form of efficiencies and optimizations.  History is also the stories of error – stories of path dependence.  
And such errors, too, should matter for historical economists. 
 
A word of thanks: I’d like to thank Deirdre McCloskey, Victoria Chick, Peter Earl, Clive Lawson, and 
the participants at the Association for Heterodox Economics Annual Meeting (LSE, July 2006) and European 
Association for Evolutionary Political Economy Annual Conference (Galatasaray University, 2006) for showing me 
the errors and vices in the paper.  Usual disclaimer applies. 
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[E]vil, too, has its own ‘solidarity.’ Error and vice are in their own way 
cumulative and tend to produce further error and vice in individuals as well 
as in nations.  There is no assurance that the forces making for disruption or 
deterioration must cancel each other out and thus bring about their own 
defeat (Ginsberg.  1953: 5). 
History books are full of success stories.  In the stories are the Dutch fighting 
with the rising seawater, Wright brothers inventing the first engined airplane, 
Neil Armstrong landing on the moon, and John Lennon singing “Imagine.”  
Historians are used to write such stories, and readers demand more.  The 
business world, obsessed with greed, wants to hear stories of winners such as 
Bill Gates.  The students of social history wondering about the Russian 
Revolution look for the sequence of events that led the Russian peoples to 
overrule the Tsar.  The historians of science want to learn how Einstein came 
up with the idea of relativity.  Intellectuals are interested in success stories 
because such events are important in human history – and they are important 
especially for those who are willing to know more about how we have reached 
the peak points of human civilization.   
History books, however, do not always credit issues of human error and 
vice.  For many believe there are always detectable “reasons” for the 
occurrence of every single human action in history – reasons through which we 
perform our thoughts in order to “choose more to less” or “reach the 
fundamental truth.”  When there is reason, there is no place for error and vice.  
They believe, for instance, that the Dutch and the British had reason to involve 
in the tulip trade in the seventeenth century when the “tulip mania” broke out.  
But can such events not be other lunacies in the past?  Is there not a place for 
insanity and madness in human history?   
In history books, the social element – that is, the set of undesirable 
consequences of the imperfect character of human doings – is usually left out 
as irrelevant.  Oddities and wrongheadedness are not at the forefronts of 
human notice.  Wrongdoings are seen only as peculiarities to be corrected 
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sooner or later.  And many people think they are dry facts, so to speak, 
knowledge of which shouldn’t really bother the “knower,” in Deweyean terms.   
The question to be asked is, Did all our ancestors do things better?  No, 
of course, they didn’t.  “The Earth [was] at rest,” Ptolemy thought, “[that] it 
[was] in the centre of the Universe, and that fixed stars move[d] together as a 
sphere” (Field 1981: 349).  Stanley Jevons thought there was a connection 
between sunspots and business cycles.  A great deal of economists – among 
them Paul Samuelson – misjudged that markets would always produce efficient 
and optimal outcomes.  Sungook Hong reports that Guglielmo Marconi’s 
invention of the transmission of wireless signals across Atlantic was based 
upon a big mistake: 
A number of notable scientists and engineers joined Marconi in believing it possible 
for electromagnetic waves to travel over a wall of ocean, based on the current 
theories of the electron and ether, in which the electron was regarded as a “knot” of 
the electric strain in the ether. In this theoretical framework, the earth itself 
functioned as a sort of huge waveguide. However, it was not long before Marconi's 
idea of surface transmission was shown to be in error, for the electron was soon 
identified with real particles, and it was also shown that the earth could not guide 
waves as Marconi believed. We now know the electromagnetic waves that Marconi 
received in St. John's in 1901 did not get there by traveling along the surface of the 
earth, but by reflecting off the upper ionosphere (now known as the Heaviside-
Kennelly layer). Marconi's achievement, based on the science of his time, was based 
upon a “big mistake” (Hong 2006) 
Ziliak and McCloskey reported that of the 182 papers published in American 
Economic Review during 1980s 70% did not distinguish statistical significance 
from economic significance and 96% misused statistical significance tests 
(Ziliak and McCloskey 1996).  They conducted the same survey for the 
empirical papers of the next decade, and concluded that the case was not 
getting better.  Economists have since 1980s not ceased to make the same 
error.  “Of the 137 relevant papers in the 1990s,” write Ziliak and McCloskey 
(2004), “82% mistook statistically significant coefficients for economically 
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significant coefficients (as against 70% in the earlier decade).  In the 1980s 53% 
had relied exclusively on statistical significance as a criterion of importance at 
its first use; in the 1990s 64% did.” Ziliak and McCloskey comment on the 
problem on her recent book, too, Size Matters (2007 forthcoming). 
The sociological question is how such an error can persist.  Or, rather, the economic 
question is why, because sociologists have less trouble than economists do – 
another trained incapacity – in supposing that people can persist in stupidity year 
after year.  Economists on the contrary like to wonder why some smart person 
doesn’t pick up the largely denominated bill, start a new intellectual firm, and reap 
the profits.  If null hypothesis significance testing is as idiotic as we and its other 
critics believe, how has it survived? 
Indeed, as Mark Blaug in his Retrospect stated, “but equally obviously, it must be 
insisted, great chunks of the history of economic thought are about mistakes in 
logic and gaps in analysis ... [mistakes which] propelled forward by the desire to 
refine, to improve, to perfect” (Blaug 1979: ix).  Yet, why have history books so 
long been stuck with the stories of the will to perfection despite the fact that 
thinkers make mistake and commit vice which are almost never corrected?  
Why, in other words, have we so much been obsessed with the stories of 
success and paid little or no attention to human error and vice that cause 
undesirable consequences for the future? 
Charles Mackay in his Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of 
Crowds focused on manias, follies, and delusions in human history.  He covered 
such issues as “The South-Sea Bubble,” “The Witch Mania,” and “The Slow 
Poisoners,” about which he wrote in 1852: “We find that whole communities 
suddenly fix their minds upon one object, and go mad in its pursuit; that 
millions of people become simultaneously impressed with one delusion, and 
run after it, till their attention is caught by some new folly more captivating 
than the first” (Mackay 1852: xv).  Many haven’t noticed the stories of madness 
in the past, but we live by the consequences of idiocy, insanity, and irony such 
as those that Charles Mackay mentioned in his book.   
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Why are such events important?  Why should we be interested in the 
history of error?  Human error and vice are important because some of them 
are left uncorrected in time.  That is to say, we keep repeating the same errors 
through time.  And uncorrected errors of past sometimes generate 
disappointments about concrete situations in the future, because such errors 
prevent us from producing pragmatic solutions to practical problems in the 
economy and society.  They prevent us from reaching “the general 
equilibrium.” They prevent us from getting at “the fundamental truth.”  The 
world is not the best of all possible worlds.  The world, unlike the portrayals of 
Paul Samuelson, George Stigler, and others alike, is a world of transaction 
costs, as Ronald Coase argued, in the form of human error and mistake.  
Consequences of such errors and mistakes, which do not disappear easily and 
without causing further trouble, make the idea impossible – the idea that 
perfection in the world of humans is achievable.   
As William Coleman correctly points at: “Indeed, instead of moving 
further away (‘ahead’) from the past, economic thought has sometimes moved 
‘forward into the past’ as old problems recur, and older theories live again.  
Thus in the 1970s slow growth of the UK economy promoted Roger Bacon 
and Walter Eltis to advance classical growth like diagnoses of this sluggishness: 
too few producers.  Similarly, the war between post-Keynesians and 
Monetarists in the same period was reminiscent of the 1840s controversy 
between the Banking School and the Currency School” (Coleman 2005).  And 
likewise, the South Sea Bubble was repeated when the Wall Street crashed in 
1929.  Families were torn apart at the time.  People turned beggars (Mackay, 
1995:  46-88; Colbert 2001: 13-14).  Alchemists and fortunetellers are still alive 
at the present.  They keep occupied the minds of many people who read 
astrology magazines.  We have so long forgotten the business of witchcraft, 
but witchcraft remains (at least) conceptually in our daily lives.   
There is a strong tendency that after Samuelson nobody needs Adam 
Smith (Boulding 1971).  In fact, it is not wise to look up Adam Smith to read 
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the best theory of division of labor.  Sophisticated versions of the theories of 
the nineteenth century are printed in many contemporary economics 
textbooks.  It is a vice, however, to ignore the historical past of economic 
science as if there were a single path of progress headed at perfection.  
Economists have incorrectly assumed that whatever knowledge that economics 
departments produce would immediately add to the body of economic science.  
Some texts, which were not considered as important at the time they were first 
published, could come to the forefronts of the economic theory only years 
after their publication.  Cournot’s model of competition and Wicksell’s theory 
of inflation are among the examples showing us that good ideas are sometimes 
completely ignored or stood out of economists’ sight (Coleman 2005).   
* 
It is an important fact that because of lack of attention, skill, and so forth, we 
are dependent on the outcome of such erroneous events.  They keep 
producing undesirable consequences for the future.  We, for instance, 
sometimes forget what happened in the past, and thus, societies collapse.  
Consequences are really dramatic.  “Chaco Canyon Anasazi society survived 
several droughts before succumbing to a big drought in the 12th century AD,” 
writes Jared Diamond in his Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed 
(2004),“but earlier droughts which would thus have been unanticipated 
because the Anasazi lacked writing” (Diamond 2004: 422).  Or we may fail to 
perceive the problem although we face it: “Global warming takes the form of a 
slow trend concealed by wide up-and-down fluctuations.  Temperatures 
around the world have been caused by humans.  However, it is not the case 
that the climate each year has been exactly 0.01 degree warmer than in the 
previous years.  Instead +1, +2, -4, -1, +5.  With such large and unpredictable 
fluctuations, it has taken a long time to discern the average upwards trend of 0.  
01 degree per year within that noisy signal” (Diamond 2004: 425).  Many of 
those events are the “historical small events,” as economists such as Brian 
Arthur (1994: especially chapter II) have come to know them, which have 
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generated certain paths into which our civilization today is locked.  They are 
the events that have caused the institutions to evolve dependently on a path.   
Historical perspectives in the economic science that path dependence 
endorses are the tools to solve the problems that such traditional methods as 
optimization and efficiency cannot solve.  Or, so it has been conceived.  An 
incorrect but widely accepted view in the debate on the path dependence of 
social institutions is that path dependence is a consequence of inefficiency and 
sub-optimality in the economy and society.  Path dependence, the established 
view maintains, is the consequence of inefficient calculations of engineers 
while building a bridge.  It is the consequence of the sub-optimal decisions of 
the buyers in the market of mechanical keyboards or operating systems.  It is 
always because of the miscalculation of individuals in the past, which result in 
undesirable and underachieving consequences today.  But is it in fact so?  Are 
efficiency and optimality always the causes for path dependence in the 
economy and society? Or, are there other sociological reasons such as 
persistance of error and stupidity? 
Path dependence is about historical small events that cause 
undesirability today; but it isn’t necessarily a consequence (or cause) of 
inefficiency and sub-optimality.   
Herbert Simon early in 1956 argued that “evidently, organisms adapt well 
enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not, in general, ‘optimize’” (Simon 1956).  Simon 
thought, as Jack Vromen writes, that the outcome of satisficing behavior will 
not be identical to the perfect outcome of optimizing behavior” (Vromen 
1994: 155).  Indeed, satisficing does not necessarily mean perfection of the 
outcomes of the choices – just as path dependence does not necessarily mean 
efficiency or sub-optimality of the outcome of the choices.  What makes the 
two notions – that is satisficing and path dependence – resemble each other is 
that perfect outcomes can sometimes not be achieved.  Despite the differences, 
I think, both point out that perfection is not always achievable by means of 
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optimization: inefficiency does not imply outcomes that are not satisficing.  
The equation goes thus: path dependence against perfection against satisficing.   
Consider now an engineer working on the project of building a bridge that 
would make the traffic flow more smoothly in the Turkish capital city of 
Ankara.  The objective function of the engineer is to complete the project 
while keeping the costs at a minimum and helping the bridge function at a 
maximum level.  In order to achieve the objective, the engineer would use 
every opportunity to lower the costs and increase the functionality of the 
bridge.  The engineer is interested in efficiency at every single step of the 
construction in the first place, primarily because what matters for him is to 
bring the abstract equation of optimization into life, therefore find a working 
solution to the concrete problem of the traffic in downtown.   
True, efficiency and optimization are important for engineers in most 
cases, because inefficiency and sub-optimality sometimes prevent us from 
achieving the task.  Engineers were correct, for instance, when they cared 
about achieving efficiency while building A-380 airplanes in order not to cause 
dissatisfaction for the passengers to fly with them.  Indeed, using inputs such 
as concrete or steel more or less than necessary can make the foundations of 
the bridge vulnerable.  Yet traditional methods have limitations in some cases 
anyway.  There are such cases where sophisticated calculations of efficiency 
and optimization are impossible.  When there are increasing returns, for 
instance, on which Paul David and Brian Arthur have extensively written, the 
goal of efficiency and optimization plays a secondary role, if any.  You may 
complain about the “inefficiency” of Windows operating systems, but it 
doesn’t necessarily make you able to use other operating systems.  You have to 
keep using Windows operating systems in order to safely connect your 
business network to other networks and run such application programs as 
Internet Explorer or Microsoft Word without problems.  Or, you want to 
change your old expensive mobile service provider, but it may not be so smart 
a move after all because you may have been using the same phone number for 
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years and your friends and colleagues may have known you with the same 
number since you had your first mobile years ago.   
The point here is the following: When there are “increasing returns” or 
“network economies” in the economy and society, such as in knowledge-based 
industries, the best strategy for individuals is to keep away from doing errors 
while taking an action – not necessarily achieving efficiency and optimality 
because, as Arthur writes,  
You cannot optimize in the casino of increasing-returns games.  You can be smart.  
You can be cunning.  You can position.  You can observe.  But when the games 
themselves are not even fully defined, you cannot optimize.  What you can do is 
adapt.  Adaptation, in the proactive sense, means watching for the next wave that is 
coming, figuring out what shape it will take, and positioning the company to take 
advantage of it.  Adaptation is what drives increasing-returns businesses, not 
optimization (Arthur 1996).   
You avoid, in other words, systematic mistakes – that is, you try not to repeat 
the same mistake for another time.  And you especially try to steer clear of 
errors that occur as a consequence of idiocy, delusion, and wrongheadedness.  
You want to keep yourself away from such errors because you have to 
maintain your level of individual satisfaction at a maximum – and a maximum 
may well be far away from the maximum that you can reach by using abstract 
equations of optimization on blackboard.  Efficiency and optimization play a 
secondary role in here since you may not always have the chance to make the 
best move.  That is to say, you may not be able to switch to other operating 
systems than Windows, or you may not want to change your mobile service 
provider as freely and knowingly as an engineer can increase or decrease the 
amount of concrete and steel while building a bridge.  If you switch to another 
operating system or service provider, you may have taken an erroneous action.  
For you don’t want to be unable to open the important files of your business 
company, all of which are written in Microsoft Word, and you don’t want to 
lose the contact with your friends and colleagues.   
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Efficiency and optimality, therefore, in specific cases, are not sufficient for 
economists and engineers to feel satisfied about the task that they want to 
accomplish.  Strategy choice of individuals entirely depends on the task.  The 
goal of human action may sometimes be to build a bridge to make the traffic 
flow better and sometimes use an application program without running into 
trouble.  The place of efficiency and optimality in the debate may completely 
be irrelevant: because the individual may not be in a situation to make a choice 
only with regards to the variables of marginal calculations; because there may 
be other variables that she cannot change – and, because, too, “small events” 
in the past may cause “big” consequences for the future.  In such an 
environment, what matters is whether a practical problem is solved and 
whether a working solution is produced.  The issues of desirability and 
satisfaction are what economists and engineers should rather concern about.   
Arrogance of economists and historians 
A very important point here, however, is nevertheless that disappointments do 
not always occur because of “historical small events.” “Big events,” too, cause 
disappointments in the form of inefficiencies and sub-optimalities.  It is not a 
surprise to know that some societies collapse; it is simply because – yes – they 
cannot optimize.  We were told, for instance, that the German defeated the 
French in the WWII because of the failure of the French military preperations.  
Jared Diamond tells the story:  
After the horrible bloodbath of WW1, France recognized its vital need to protect 
itself against the possibility of another German invasion.  Unfortunately, the French 
army staff assumed that a next war would be fought similarly to WW1, in which the 
Western Front between France and Germany had remained locked in static trench 
warfare for four years.  Defensive infantry forces fortified trenches that had 
deployed the newly invented tanks only individually and just in support of attacking 
infantry.  Hence France constructed an even more elaborate and expensive system 
of fortifications, as Maginot Line, to guard its eastern frontier against Germany.  
But the German army staff having been defeated in WW1, recognized the need for 
a different strategy.  It used tanks rather than infantry to spearhead its attacks, 
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massed the tanks into armored divisions, bypassed the Maginot Line through 
forested terrain previously considered unsuitable for tanks, and thereby defeated 
French generals made a common mistake: generals often plan for a coming war as 
if it will be like the previous war, especially if that previous war was victorious 
(Diamond 2004: 423).   
Likewise, people fail in their lives because they make bad marriages.  They 
sometimes choose wrong schools.  Politicians lie.  Undergraduate students at 
economics departments fail their exams because they miscalculate the marginal 
revenue of economic agents in the proposed question, and so forth.   
The problem is the following: Economists and historians sometimes 
arrogantly claim that all disappointments today are only because people in the 
past didn’t work things out efficiently.  They say economic agents in the past 
didn’t optimize well, and undesirable consequences have thus occurred.  But 
this is wrong because, as the examples of path dependence suggests, 
sometimes even when the agents work things out efficiently and optimize the 
constraints well, they still have undesirable consequences for the future as an 
outcome.  Arrogant treatments of many economists and historians are undue 
as they are like accusing women for wearing skirts, or accusing Muslims for 
going to mosques.  True, as I argued above, there is a great score of historical 
cases where efficiency doesn’t guide the institutional choice at all.  But 
nevertheless past generations, to my view, cannot be accused on the basis that 
the failure today is only because past generations couldn’t meet the 
requirements of efficiency and optimality.  The point regarding path 
dependence is rather that there are many historical small events in the course 
of institutional evolution, causing failure and thus dissatisfaction in the 
economy and society.  The role of such events has nothing to do with 
individuals’ calculations as to achieve efficiency and optimality.  
Jared Diamond in his Guns, Germs, and Steel speaks of contingent 
geographical and bio-geographical factors – such as “continents’ different 
areas, axes, and suites wild plant and animal species” – as major events (that is 
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“small events”) affecting the prospects of societies on earth in the last 10,000 
years.  “The remaining factor behind Africa’s slower rate of post-Pleistocene 
development compared with Eurasia’s is the different orientation of the main 
axes of these continents,” writes Diamond, 
Like that of the Americas, Africa’s major axis is north-south, whereas Eurasia’s is 
east-west.  As one moves along as north-south axis, one traverses zones differing 
greatly in climate, habitat, rainfall, day length, and diseases of corps and livestock.  
Hence corps and animals domesticated or acquired in one part of Africa had great 
difficulty in moving to other parts.  In contrast, corps and animals moved easily 
between Eurasian societies thousands of miles apart but at the same latitude and 
sharing similar climates and day lengths (Diamond 1999: 399). 
Kenneth Arrow, in a similar fashion, has reported, relying on the Dutch 
historian Pieter Geyl’s The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century (1961-1964), that 
beyond the motivations that caused the separation of the Netherlands from 
Belgium was the contingent and accidental set of events that had given great 
advantages the Protestants in the North of low countries against the 
sovereignty of the Spanish rule because “the convoluted sea coasts in the 
North provided great refuge for the rebels.” 
As the Spanish regain control in the South, Protestant refugees fled to North, 
changing the religious balance.  It was therefore because of geography that the 
North became the successful point of resistance and also the center of 
Protestantism, to the point that when independence was ceded to the North, the 
two areas became increasing divergent in religion and other social attitudes.  Two 
hundred years later, the unity of the Netherlands was reestablished by the decision 
of the victors over Napoleon but could not be maintained with such divergence of 
religion and of national sentiment (Arrow 2000). 
The difference that historical small events make in the evolution of human 
institutions is that there is no single scientific explanation that fits to every 
single situation when they are in order.  As historical small events play 
significant roles in history, “explanations” about the evolution of economic 
and social institutions become “historical narratives.”  And such narratives are 
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complex and specific, in that – such stories tell us the readers – we always 
optimize, for instance, our shares in the exchange markets or we build the 
bridges in the most efficient way, but the consequences of our actions in the 
past still cause undesirable consequences.  
Consider Thorstein Veblen’s Imperial Germany and Industrial Revolution, in 
which he subscribes to the “efficiency guides all” view of reading history.  The 
discussion figures in the recent literature, too.  Veblen’s discussion, in a 
nutshell, is about whether “technological innovations and creations of an 
institutional nature have in many cases [reached] their fullest serviceability only 
at the hands of other communities and other peoples than those to whom 
these cultural elements owed their origin and initial success” (Veblen 1915: 22).  
The story is based on whether it is more practicable to carry over a state of art 
from one community to another.  The problem for Veblen, therefore, is a 
matter of efficient use of technological developments.   
Germany combines the results of English experience in the development of 
modern technology with a state of the other arts of life more nearly equivalent to 
what prevailed in England before the modern industrial regime came on; so that the 
German people have been enabled to take up the technological heritage of the 
English without having paid for it in the habits of thought, the use and wont, 
induced in the English community by the experience involved in achieving it.  
Modern technology has come to the Germans ready-made, without cultural 
sequences which its gradual development and continued use has entailed among the 
people whose experience initiated it and determined the course of its development 
(1915: 82-83) 
An economy, according to Veblen, might be left with a relatively inferior 
technology, or the circumstances in an economy might not be conducive to the 
best material interest of the system in force if a community’s past habits of 
thought are at cross-purpose with the conditions of life afforded by the new 
state of industrial arts.  The problem, basically, is a matter of cultural 
conditions in the early phases of the “life history” of any community.   
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Veblen’s point is identical to the account of wrongly established path 
dependence in the sense that some of the past experiences might lead to non-
optimal results at the present time.  Veblen’s story is about the implications of 
the fact that the railways of Great Britain were constructed with too narrow a 
gauge compared to those of American and German railway systems in the 
Edwardian Britain (1885 and 1950).  “Silly little bobtailed carriages,” Veblen 
argues, was an inefficient technology primarily because British coal wagons had 
a very limited carrying capacity.  He reports that the fact was known by the 
experts of the time, though the remedy was not so easy to implement.  The 
fundamental reason was that all the terminal facilities, tracks, shunting facilities, 
and all the ways and means of handling freight on this oldest railway system 
were all adapted to the bobtailed cars.  The infrastructure and equipment, such 
as the roadbed and metal, and the engines, additionally, were not sufficient to 
take care of the increased traffic when some technological improvements first 
went into operation.  It was, therefore, not without any trouble to introduce 
new technologies since “the chief significance of this work of improvement, 
adaptation and repair in this connection [was] that it [argued] a fatal reluctance 
or inability to overcome this all-pervading depreciation by obsolescence” 
(1915: 127). 
Veblen’s example, however, is closely scrutinized by Van Vleck who has 
shown that the case might not be necessarily so.  She proved that British 
carriages were not economically “inefficient” or “irrational” but merely 
substitutes for more costly distribution and delivery means such as horses, hay 
and oats, trucks, and petroleum fuel.  Small wagons, therefore, were used 
because they suited the existing infrastructure, but not because they were 
economically at the margin (See Van Vleck 1997 and 1999). 
Paul David, a prominent figure in the debate on path dependence in 
economics, had once fallen into the trap, too.  David, especially in his early 
writings (David 1985, 1986, 1992), adhered strictly to the efficiency-guides-all-
institutional-choice viewpoint.  His infamous story about mechanical and 
 15 
digital keyboards, “QWERTY-nomics,” as he prefers to name it, was entirely 
based on the efficiency view: “During the 1940’s,” David wrote, “the US Navy 
experiments had shown that the increased efficiency obtained with [Dvorak 
Simplified Keyboards] would amortize the cost of retraining a group of typists 
within the first ten days of their subsequent fulltime employment” (David 
1985).  And also, David argued in the paper, “despite the presence of the sort 
of externalities that standard static analysis tells us would interfere with the 
achievement of the socially optimal degree of system compatibility, 
competition in the absence of perfect futures markets drove the industry 
prematurely into standardization on the wrong system where decentralized 
decision making subsequently has sufficed to hold it.”  
Writing on the reasons for slow gains in measured productivity rates in 
computer industries, David also thought that approaching the issue from the 
perspective of economic history the so-called productivity paradox would 
disappear or be “found to be neither so unprecedented nor so puzzling as they 
might otherwise appear” (David 1990).  Historical errors and failures, he 
argued, have caused productivity slowdowns in the computer industry.  “The 
nature of man-machine interactions and technical problems of designing 
efficient interfaces for humans and computers” have prevented the engineers 
from optimizing efficiently.   
The argument, however, that path dependence generates inefficient and 
sub-optimal solutions, I think, is too far-fetched – as many of his critics have 
already shown (Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, 1995a, 1995b, 1998 and 
McCloskey at an e-seminar on Eh.net in 1999).  Path dependence is not always 
about inefficiencies.  It is about errors into which we are locked in the 
economy and society in general, but it is not necessarily about “market 
failures” of capitalist market economies.  Instead, path dependence is a 
metaphor for disappointment about the institutional matrix of industrialized 
economies.  It is about economists’ and other scientists’ contention that 
 16 
thinkers’ will to perfection is a misleading one when institutions of network 
economies, positive feedbacks, and irreversabilities, and so forth rule. 
David, I think, had committed the same error of assuming the triumph of 
the will to perfection in his early writings.  Where, I believe, David went wrong 
was that he saw that history was full of inefficient solutions and sub-optimal 
calculations.  His worldview was that disappointments in history were primarily 
caused by inefficiencies and sub-optimalities that were consequences of “big 
events” – as opposed to Arthur’s “historical small events” – in the past.  
Capitalist economies, for David, were doomed to “market failures” because, he 
thought, inefficiency and lack of optimality were internal to the socio-
economic system.  That is to say, in one way or another, inefficiencies would 
pop up in capitalist market economies.  There were big forces running human 
history.  Examples of inefficiency and sub-optimality were characteristics of 
capitalist economies historically.   
David responds to his critics… 
Liebowitz and Margolis maintain that “the main focus and novelty of the 
current economic literature of path dependence is on the ‘third-degree form,’ 
and prominent examples in the literature feature specific claims of inefficiency 
… Our reading of the evidence[, however,] is that there are as yet no proven 
examples of the third degree of path dependence in markets … It is the third- 
degree path dependence claim that constitutes a new challenge to invisible-
hand theorems that private optimization leads individuals to wealth 
maximizing allocations” (Liebowitz and Margolis 1998).  Liebowitz and 
Margolis, in other words, do not think QWERTY an apt example of path 
dependence.   
But David, after all, seems to not agree with the point now: 
Unfortunately, the use of that phrase [of historical small events] itself is prone to 
cause misunderstandings.  It is quite misleading to take it to suggest that some 
original economic irrationality or implementation error (accident) must be 
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implicated whenever we find that positive network externalities have given rise to a 
sequence that turned out to be other than a globally optimal path.  Indeed, only 
those who are hostile to the very idea of path dependence would repeatedly insist 
upon a literal interpretation of the phrase ‘accidents of history.’  Doing so suggests 
that the essential feature of such processes is that the original actors in the drama – 
whether as contributors to the design of a technical system, or an institutional rule 
structure, or a particular form of business organization, or as the initial adopters of 
such innovations – had to have been acting arbitrarily, or irrationally in the context 
of their economic circumstances.  Such an interpretation is not only logically 
unwarranted; it obfuscates an important but widely overlooked feature common to 
the histories of many network technologies, and one that has some bearing upon 
the way public policy might be approached in that area (David 2004). 
David has long been the only one in the literature who has replied to the 
critics.  He has taken the trouble, in a number of lately published articles, to 
better explicate why his notion of path dependence does not necessarily imply 
inefficiency and market failure.  In his replies, it seems, David wants to free 
path dependence from the conception of inefficiency – or, better, he likes at 
least to unchain the two notions theoretically, without touching the original 
story of QWERTY in his seminal paper in 1985.  It is this link which is the 
main source of the suspicion of many critics.  What is surprising in his 
responses is that they are simply based on the notions of “blackboard.” That is 
to say, he does not provide further empirical evidence about the QWERTY 
case that what he meant was not inefficiency and sub-optimality – which was 
in fact the central point of his critics (Liebowitz and Margolis 1990, 1995 and 
McCloskey 1999).  David does not answer the question whether or not path 
dependence in the QWERTY case implies market failure and inefficiency.  He 
rather attacks on his critics by appealing to whether the critique is theoretically 
consistent.  Consider the following lines: 
In discussing the conceptualization of third-degree path dependence in which there 
is market failure leading to inefficiencies of an ‘irremediable’ kind, Liebowitz and 
Margolis … make reference to the test of ‘remediability’ suggested by Oliver E. 
Williamson.  But, they entirely omit mention of the important distinction that 
Williamson’s (1993) work drew between remediability through ‘private ordering’ 
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and through ‘public ordering’.  Nowhere in the literature dealing with theoretical 
and empirical aspects of path dependent economic phenomena have I found it said 
that this property leads to outcomes for which remediation via public ordering is 
wholly infeasible.  For the state to undertake to ‘correct’ a market outcome might 
become socially inefficient.  But that is a different proposition from its being simply 
infeasible.  So, it is not open to the critics to claim that path dependence would 
have empirical or policy substance for economists if only it did not exclude the 
possibility of remediation by public ordering in those circumstances where private 
ordering was unworkable (David 2000). 
The point regarding the economics of path dependence, to my view, is not to 
be proven by means of “blackboard economics. ” Path dependence is an 
empirical notion – that is to say, what is important for path dependence 
research is why the case of QWERTY was a good example of path dependence 
in the economy although the case didn’t feature inefficiency at all.  Liebowitz 
and Margolis have repeatedly asked the question: “Is it appropriate to use 
stories that are known to be factually incorrect in order to illustrate economic 
theory or teach economic history?” (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995).  
Early works of David seems to not be focused on the details of such 
issues as efficiency and market failures.  He was then primarily interested in 
“the quest for historical economics” – an urge to transform the future of 
economics into an historical social science.  After the publication of the story 
of QWERTY (David 1985, 1986, 1992, and so forth), however, especially in 
the critical writings of Liebowitz and Margolis, David was forced to explicate 
the “real” relation of path dependence to efficiency and optimality.  David, to 
my view, has certainly had in mind, since the beginning of his research on the 
economics of railways and technological innovation (David 1969 and 1975), 
that capitalist economies were prone to generate disappointments in the form 
of inefficiencies and sub-optimalities.  The metaphor of path dependence was 
merely a tool to express his mind.  But facing the issues in a number of later 
articles, David has argued that what QWERTY story in fact told was not that 
network industries, under circumstances in which path dependence rules, 
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necessarily produce inefficiency – inefficiency, as he repeatedly noted in a 
number of places, was never a necessary and sufficient condition for path 
dependence.  David has nevertheless never denied the possible connection 
between path dependence and efficiency.  In a late publication he wrote: 
“Bygones are just bygones when one is concerned with economic efficiency (as 
I am at this point), rather than equity – unless, of course, memory draws the past 
into the present and makes it a basis for actions affecting efficiency in the 
future” (David 2005).  He has only very recently revealed out, in the same 
article, what he in fact had in mind: “theatre for the unfolding of historical 
dramas.” Indeed, passages like below keep appearing, as he does not entirely 
deny the connection between efficiency view and path dependence: 
To be sure, it should be recognized that among the conditions that give rise to the 
existence of multiple equilibria and path dependent dynamics, there are some that 
also would prevent the workings of competitive markets from arriving unerringly at 
allocations that are socially efficient in the sense of Pareto.  Prominent in that 
company are micro-level irreversibilities in the behavior of agents, due to learning 
by doing and the habituation of tastes; and externalities affecting non-market 
interactions in the spheres of consumption and production that give rise to co-
ordination games which end in “co-ordination failures.” Consequently, while the 
logical relationship between path dependence and market failure is neither one of 
necessity nor sufficiency, there are some important underlying connections between 
the two” (David.  2004). 
But why is the debate about efficiency and market failure so important for 
David’s understanding of path dependence?  One may certainly suggest many 
reasons.  I, however, like to draw on one aspect of the issue, and comment on 
the rhetoric of his work on the case of QWERTY.  The paper in which he 
introduced the case is an interesting one.  For one thing, David makes several 
mistakes of interpreting the experiments by virtue of which it was supposedly 
proven that QWERTY was superior to its alternatives.  The paper and story, 
however, have been a standard reference in the path dependence literature.  It 
suggests that despite the mistakes he makes in the story of QWERTY, I think, 
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David is nevertheless a very successful storyteller.  His story deserves critical 
scrutiny from a rhetorical perspective. 
The rhetorics of the story of QWERTY 
“There is an amazing irony of rhetorical success,” David writes, “in the inordinate 
attention that was captured by one specific illustration of the workings of path 
dependence, and the consequencet significance with which debates over its 
factual details continues to be endowed … The story of QWERTY provided 
the simplest heuristic device I could find that might provoke economists to 
take seriously the ways in which past events have shaped the world around us” 
(David 1997).   The illustrative story of QWERTY is now the amblem of path 
dependence and the label for the claim that “history matters. ” The story has 
been subject to heavy criticism but survived the attacks.  Upon the criticisms 
directed at the story of QWERTY, David writes:  
Indeed, in my view, the obsessive character of QWERTY-skepticism itself 
threatens to distract attention from the more general class of theoretical questions 
and empirical phenomena for which QWERTY was intended to be only a readily 
comprehensible symbol.  To be sure, there is (by design) considerable rhetorical 
force in this illustration.  That must bear some of the responsibility for the fact that 
so many economists continue to be hung up on the question of whether or not 
QWERTY is the best keyboard available today; and, if it isn’t, whether that entails a 
“big” economic inefficiency, or one the should be dismissed as inconsequentially 
small.  For scholars seriously interested in the historical development of typewriting 
technology this could be a reasonable obsession.  But, to suppose that it is 
substantively crucial to any of the interesting issues that surround path dependence 
and its economic policy implications is just plain silly (David 1999).  
David presented the article at the 1984 American Economic Association 
Annual Meetings, and the article – which has been the shortest among his 
works that David has ever got published – appeared in American Economic 
Review in 1985.  The novelty of the paper, as David reports in his own “story of 
the story of QWERTY,” was not the originality attached to the story but the 
surprising response of the audience to the paper – the paper had drawn 
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attention and everybody had found it challenging.  The AER, publishing 
articles and reviews in a wide range of specialized areas in the economic 
literature, is one of the most famous and influential journals in economics.  It 
is by no means a peculiar expectation that any piece appearing in this journal 
would be highly recognizable among economists.  The first point one should 
make while reading David article, I suppose, is then that he has experienced 
such an advantage and enjoyed the profit of being read by many scholars in 
economics.   
QWERTY is an excellent example to draw the attention of economists to 
the issue.  It is a very easy word to write, and it has mattered to almost 
everybody for some 20-30 years now.  QWERTY does not make any sense, at 
least at first glance, for the ones who are not interested in hardware 
technologies.  But the explanatory power of the “word” owes too much to its 
meaninglessness.  He uses several variants of the “word” is his article – 
“economics of QWERTY,” “QWERTYnomics” and so forth.  As Tony 
Lawson clearly points out, 
Before briefly examining the nature of David’s explanation let me recall, in passing, 
how the example immediately reminds me that all aspects of explanatory endeavors 
are inherently interest and knowledge conditioned and motivated by conflict, 
surprise and/or doubt … [I]f the letter arrangement had been ABCDEFGHIJ then 
many of us would not regard the phenomenon as one that is at all surprising and in 
particular need of being explained.  Of course, even such an unpredictable letter 
arrangement as QWERTYUIOP is of prima facie explanatory interest to an 
‘economic historian’ such as Paul David.  To the unsuspecting mainstream 
economist a ready explanation is always at hand (Lawson 1997: 249). 
The references of the paper deserve attention, too.  Here is the very first 
sentence of his article: 
Cicero demands of historians, first, that we tell true stories.  I intend fully to perform 
my duty on this occasion, by giving you a homely piece of narrative economic 
history in which “one damn thing follows another.” The main point of the story 
will be plain enough (David 1985). 
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Could someone argue that he was mistaken in choosing the name Cicero for 
such a striking introduction? I guess not.  Also consider the reference to 
Tolstoy.   
But while they are, as we now say, perfectly “free to choose,” their behavior, 
nevertheless, is held fast in the grip of events long forgotten and shaped by 
circumstances in which neither they nor their interests figured.  Like the great men 
of whom Tolstoy wrote in War and Peace, “[e]very action of theirs, that seems to 
them an act of their own free will, is in an historical sense not free at all, but in 
bondage to the whole course of previous history (David 1985). 
The implied reader of the text is not the group of economists doing their job 
using traditional or established neo-classical and mathematical tools.  
Surprisingly, throughout the article, the number of economic concepts he uses 
are not more than 20; and almost none of them are used for more than four 
times.  (Among them only “market” and “production” are used seven times.) 
Although the paper is published by a prestigious mainstream economics 
journal, the paper is organized in a way to which many economists are not 
accustomed.  The article seems to address more to the economists who explain 
the social phenomena within a historical and social setting.   
David sometimes acts as if he is more than a “worldly social scientist.” 
Just have a look at his concluding message:  
III.  Message: In place of a moral, I want to leave you with a message of faith and 
qualified hopes (.  .  .  ) I believe there are many more QWERTY worlds lying out 
there in the past, on the very edges of the modern economic analyst’s tidy universe; 
worlds we do not yet fully perceive or understand, but whose influence, like that of 
dark stars, extends nonetheless to shape the visible orbits of our contemporary 
economic affairs (David 1985).   
I have the impression that David likes to be much more analytic and intense in 
his prose than other major contributors to the literature on path dependence 
such as Brian Arthur and Douglass North.  Arthur, a trained mathematician, 
uses rigorous mathematical terms in his works in order to get his message to 
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the reader.  And North is more theoretical in expressing his views.  But David 
appears to follow a more analytic scheme when he writes and talks about path 
dependence.  Consider the following passage from a work of David’s, in which 
his “immediate task ... is to try to clarify the meaning and amplify the economic 
significance of path dependence” – a purely analytical task itself:  
Path-independent processes may be said to include those whose dynamics guarantee 
convergence to a unique, globally stable equilibrium configuration; or, in the case of 
stochastic systems, those for which there exists an invariant (stationary) asymptotic 
probability distribution that is continuous over the entire feasible space of 
outcomes – that is, a limiting distribution that is continuous over all the states that 
are compatible with the energy of the system”  (David.  2000).   
Such analytic terms as “process,” “dynamics,” “stochastic”, “energy of the 
system,” “ergodic,” among many others, abound in many of his works.  It 
seems to me that his aim, in general, is to “rescue” the idea of path dependence 
form the hands of “mainstream economic writers” and locate it on some 
critical “foundations.” David writes, in almost every single piece of his 
writings, as if he owns the metaphor of path dependence, and plays the 
“guard” against his critics, mainly against the conveyors of the “laissez-faire 
message of neoclassical microeconomics.” 
Thanks to his “tough-mindedness,” David, I think, disguises his point that 
path dependence implies the possibility of “market failure” and “efficiency.” 
“To be sure,” David writes, “there are some underlying connections between 
the existence of conditions that give rise to path dependence in economic 
processes, and the possibility that the workings of competitive markets in those 
circumstances would result in allocations that are inefficient.” Nevertheless, he 
explicitly writes, “Analytically, however, it remains a total non sequitur to assert 
that the essence of path dependence – a property defined for analyses of 
dynamical and stochastic processes – consists in asserting propositions 
regarding the possibility of ‘market failure’ that were proved first in the context 
of purely static and deterministic models” (David 2000).  Such lines can be 
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read as corrections to David’s previous works on QWERTY, but reading 
between the lines, the reader gets the impression that even in his replies to his 
critics he still has in mind that path dependence is a phenomenon that have 
come to life as a consequence of “big events.” In fact, in the following 
passages of the same work, David writes, 
From this vantage point, Arthur’s (1989) phrase ‘lock-in by small historical events’ 
is evidently a gloss that should not be read too literally; it is a convenient 
contraction of the foregoing reference to the way in which trapping regions may be 
entered – although somewhat unfortunate, in allowing a hasty reader to suppose 
that the antecedent events somehow have created the local stability, or locked-in 
state. 
To conclude: Inferiority is not the point, but error and vice are. 
Under the circumstances where path dependence rules, what matter are often 
the issues other than efficiency and optimality.  In fact, David has written that 
“self-reinforcing dynamics that such externalities set in motion is a source of 
path dependence,” and it shouldn’t pass without notice – especially in the 
“welfare economics of technology standards and standardization in the context 
of network industries” (David 2005).  Public agents, David argues, should be 
aware that the targets may not be hit after a series of policy deliberations if the 
sequential consequences of policies suggested feature path dependent 
properties.  Public agents perform best in influencing the future trajectories of 
a network technology when they know very little about what should be done.  
The dilemma – the “blind giant’s quandary,” as David calls it – arises as a 
consequence of  
identifying the characteristics of the particular technology that users eventually will 
come to value most highly, and discovering if differences might exist between the 
potentialities that the available variants have for undergoing future technical 
enhancement as a result of cumulative, incremental innovation.  Prescribing action 
guidelines for ‘blind giants’ is a dubious business at best (David 2005). 
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The best strategy for the public agent under the circumstances in which “lock-
in of an inferior technology must be considered a high-probability outcome” is 
to keep encouraging the continuation of the introduction of new R&D 
technologies directed at developing new variants of the established technology 
in the industry.  What matters most for a policy maker is then that the 
consequences of a series of policy deliberations may not always be “perfect” – 
“perfection” to be understood here in the sense of reaching ex post the targets 
that were set ex ante.  Efficiency and optimality may be replaced by, for 
instance, equity, competitveness, and novelty.  For even though efficiency and 
optimality are achieved in way of encouraging and sustaining voluntary 
standard writings by individual firms in the industry, granting exclusive 
property rights to individuals that would enjoy market dominance as a 
consequence of collecting monopoly rents as “tournament prize” might 
eventually turn out be a story of error and vice, causing divergence from the 
path that was ex ante predicted.  “As an engineering task,” David writes, “the 
writing of standards involves a continual interplay between efforts to be 
currently cost-effective and ambitions to ‘push the state of the art,’ in which it 
is quite natural for new designs to be proposed even when they are not meant 
to serve as place holders for nascent competitors” (David 2005).   
Inferiority is not intrinsic or inherent to any type of technology in any 
business.  Technologies rather become economically or socially undesirable 
when better technologies become possible in one of the neighboring 
institutional (and moral) geographies.  Every happening locks the 
circumstances into a huge body – be it a “technological paradigm” or 
“institutional matrix” – the stories of which are sometimes stories of success 
and sometimes stories of errors and vice.  As the American philosopher John 
Dewey once reported, “truths” in philosophy “are in fact only systematized 
mistakes and prejudices of our ancestors.  Many of them originated in accident; 
many in class interest and bias, perpetuated by authority for this very reason” 
(Dewey 1950: 50).  The irony for the innovator is that there are contingencies 
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in economic and social life; these can never dissolve the doubt that doing well 
at every single step in life does not necessarily add up to the life history of 
success.  In fact, errors and failure are parts of what human beings do. 
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